section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act provides that “[a]ny alien who at any time after entry is convicted under any law of... possessing . . . any weapon, part, or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device (as defined in section 921(a) of title 18, United States Code) in violation of any law is deportable.”
*There is no dispute that the respondent pled guilty to and was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. In fact, this conviction may support a finding of deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, but only if the record contains clear, unequivocal, and convincing proof that possession of a firearm was an integral element of the offense that the respondent was convicted of committing. See Matter of Lopez-Amaro, 20 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 1993), aff’d, 25 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1146 (1995); Matter of P-F-, 20 I&N Dec. 661 (BIA 1993); Matter of K-L-, 20 I&N Dec. 654 (BIA 1993), aff’d sub nom. Lee v. INS, 12 F.3d 1102 (8th Cir. 1993); see also Woodby v. INS, supra. In other words, the evidence of record must establish that the respondent was, in fact, convicted of criminally possessing a firearm within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act.
Accordingly, the starting point of our analysis is the criminal statute under which the respondent suffered his weapons conviction. See Matter of Perez-Contreras, 20 I&N Dec. 615 (BIA 1992); Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 587 (BIA 1992).*
Law
A person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree when: (1) He commits the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree as defined in subdivision one, two, three or five of section 265.01, and has been previously convicted of any crime1; (2) He possesses any explosive or incendiary bomb, bombshell, firearm silencer, machine-gun or any other firearm or weapon simulating a machine-gun and which is adaptable for such use; or (3) He knowingly has in his possession a machine-gun, firearm, rifle or shotgun which has been defaced for the purpose of concealment or prevention of the detection of a crime or misrepresenting the identity of such machine-gun, firearm, rifle or shotgun; or (4) He possesses any loaded firearm. Such possession shall not, except as provided in subdivision one, constitute a violation of this section if such possession takes place in such person’s home or place of business. (5)(i) He possesses twenty or more firearms; or (ii) he possesses a firearm and has been previously convicted of a felony or a class A misdemeanor defined in this chapter within the five years immediately preceding the commission of the offense and such possession did not take place in the person’s home or place of business.
The only document offered into the record to prove the respondent’s deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act was a “Certificate of Disposition,” a document issued by the criminal court indicating that the respondent was charged, pled guilty to, and was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. This document is considered to be a part of the respondent’s record of conviction, and, therefore, it is within the proper scope of this determination. However, as the respondent points out on appeal, this court document does not refer to the subdivision under which he was actually convicted, nor does it identify the weapon that he was convicted of possessing. Moreover, this Board does not have the benefit of reviewing the respondent’s complete record of conviction, which would essentially include the charge, plea, verdict, and sentence, since (as we previously noted) the Certificate of Disposition was the only document that was offered into the record to prove the respondent’s deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. See United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, 63 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1933); Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, supra; Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989); Matter of Mena, 17 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1979); Matter of Esfandiary, supra; Matter of Ghunaim, supra; Matter of Lopez, supra; Matter of Grazley, supra; see also 8 C.F.R. § 3.41.
Accordingly, without the respondent’s complete record of conviction and absent any reference in the Certificate of Disposition to the subdivision under which the respondent was convicted or the weapon that the respondent was convicted of possessing, we do not find that the court document that was offered into the record establishes the respondent’s deportability for a firearms violation as required by Woodby v. INS, supra.
The Immigration Judge, however, also relied upon the respondent’s testimony, detailing the incident underlying his weapons conviction, to find the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act. We agree with the respondent that the Immigration Judge’s reliance on such extrinsic evidence as his testimony was improper.
As this Board and the courts have consistently held in cases addressing the issue of whether an alien is deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, it is the nature of the crime, as defined by statute and interpreted by the courts and as limited and described by the record of conviction, which determines whether an alien falls within the reach of that law. See Gonzalez-Alvarado v. INS, 39 F.3d 245 (9th Cir. 1994); Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 1994); Okabe v. INS, 671 F.2d 863 (5th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Giglio v. Neelly, 208 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1953); United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939); Matter of Franklin, supra; Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992); Matter of Short, supra; Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988); Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 1980); Matter of Esfandiary, supra; Matter of McNaughton, 16 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978).
Since section 241(a)(2)(C), like section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, which relates to convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude, mandates a focus on an alien’s conviction, rather than his conduct, we believe the same rationale which limits our scope of inquiry to the record of conviction when determining whether an alien has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude applies with equal force here. See, e.g., Cabral v. INS, supra, at 196 n. 6; Chiaramonte v. INS, 626 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1980); Pino v. Nicolls, 215 F.2d 237, 245 (1st Cir. 1954), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955). We will therefore limit our inquiry to the respondent’s Certificate of Disposition, despite his testimony that the weapon in his possession at the time of his arrest was a gun, since it is the crime that he actually was convicted of rather than a crime that he may have committed which is the determinative issue to be resolved here. Moreover, the principle of not looking behind a record of conviction provides this Board with the only workable approach in cases where deportability is premised on the existence of a conviction. If we were to allow evidence that is not part of the record of conviction as proof of whether an alien falls within the reach of section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, we essentially would be inviting the parties to present any and all evidence bearing on an alien’s conduct leading to the conviction, including possibly the arresting officer’s testimony or even the testimony of eyewitnesses who may have been at the scene of the crime. Such an endeavor is inconsistent both with the streamlined adjudication that a deportation hearing is intended to provide and with the settled proposition that an Immigration Judge cannot adjudicate guilt or innocence. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984).
If we were to make an exception here and accept the respondent’s testimony as proof of his deportability under section 241(a)(2)(C) of the Act, there would be no clear stopping point where this Board could limit the scope of seemingly dispositive but extrinsic evidence bearing on the respondent’s deportability. We believe that the harm to the system induced by the consideration of such extrinsic evidence far outweighs the beneficial effect of allowing it to form the evidentiary basis of a finding of deportability. See generally Cabral v. INS, supra; Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Zaffarano v. Corsi, supra; United States ex rel. Robinson v. Day, 51 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1931).