The US and allied defence forces are increasingly focused on conventional "near-peer" conflict, after years primarily focused on counterinsurgency. Preparing for conventional conflicts seems to go hand-in-hand with expensive procurement programs for very advanced equipment, which is rarely used because we don't actually fight a lot of near-peer wars. For example, the F-22 Raptor program has apparently cost at least $67 billion but the fighters have barely seen meaningful combat in their intended air superiority capacity.
It is apparently also quite possible that even these assets wouldn't actually be capable of achieving the intended outcomes in a conventional war; they may not be providing the expensive hedge we're expecting of them. For example, Australia is currently spending $70-80 billion on submarines, but Hugh White argues that the amount and type of submarines being purchased are not actually sufficient to meaningfully ensure control of the high number of sea approaches that exist to Australia. Further examples of this kind are in his book.
In that context, it is interesting to consider whether military spending could be more heavily focused on equipment that is consistently useful in the broader range of sub-conflict, security-relevant situations that our military finds itself in, rather than only truly useful in an all-out war.
What might this look like?
Investing in lower-cost autonomous systems that can provide a more persistent asymmetric presence in order to deter conflict and coercion. Many people note that China’s investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) missile systems has given them an asymmetric advantage against US power projection — an anti-ship missile is much cheaper than the aircraft carrier it sinks. Our spending on large platforms is not useful if they fail to produce a genuine deterrent effect because they are too threatened by A2AD to actually be deployed into a flashpoint like the Taiwan Strait during a crisis. Acknowledging this threat dynamic, perhaps we should invest less in large platforms and more in relatively cheap, distributed, autonomous systems that actually can persist in those locations and exercise a deterrent effect prior to conflict breaking out.
Investing in defence against economic warfare, especially by cyber disruption and cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property. This is a prime example of where we may be under-investing in defence against unconventional attacks that are definitely happening now and already harming us, while over-investing in defence against much less likely conventional threats. What if the Australian Signals Directorate's defensive function was made 10 times larger than it is now? What if the government took a much more aggressive stance in enabling the publicly-funded cyber defence and hardening of major private companies and public research institutions? It doesn’t feel like we’re hitting any limits on what we can do for cyber defence as a nation, and the state's level of responsibility for cyber defence is much weaker than its approach to conventional defence. The Army doesn't just provide training and advice to civilians and ask them to defend themselves if war comes, but this is basically what we do for civilian cyber defence.
Preparing for economic warfare
It's worth noting that foreign doctrine incorporates cyber and economic warfare as a key aspect of hybrid warfare. For example, see the PLA-published book:
Broadening the definition of defence to incorporate defence against foreign interference. This acknowledges that 'hybrid warfare' approaches taken by adversaries mean interference is an inherent form of peer conflict in the current era. While measures to counter foreign interference have received increasing attention, they are still given just a tiny fraction of the resources devoted to procuring conventional defence materiel. Some ideas on potential counter-measures include broad media education and NGO funding, diaspora community engagement, and more comprehensive investment and immigration screening. More detail is explored in these references:
Building connectivity between our defence forces and our domestic security agencies. Economic and information warfare will increasingly blur the lines between 'conflict', a military responsibility, and 'interference' or 'espionage', which are the responsibility of law enforcement and security agencies. It is critical that these groups work more closely together, perhaps in ways comparable to how the terrorism threat has foreign and domestic dimensions that have required stronger collaboration between different parts of the intelligence apparatus.
Investing in special forces capabilities that enable the conduct of unconventional warfare, such as peacetime liaison with friendly foreign militaries to reduce third-party influence there, conduct of information operations, and so on**.** Some ideas on this topic, and related topics such as increasing the importance of support units that are currently reservist-heavy, are explored at:
Investing in assets that are useful for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), both for our neighbours and in domestic natural disaster contexts. In 2020 we have seen the US deploy hospital ships to assist with the COVID-19 pandemic and Australia deploy a landing helicopter dock to evacuate citizens from a coastal bushfire zone. White argues that the current LHDs are overkill for most amphibious operations - it is extremely rare to have to use their full capability such as landing a battalion in 30 minutes. Smaller amphibious vessels would be fine for most military operations, and also cheaper to use frequently in HADR situations. Similarly, perhaps we could do with more jeeps and trucks that are useful for logistics in many contexts, and fewer tanks and armoured fighting vehicles given the relatively low likelihood of us engaging in large-scale ground combat (in comparison to naval and air combat defending the approaches to Australia).
Investing in assets that are useful for preventing transnational crime, not just nation-state conflicts. For example, obtaining more small patrol boats that are useful for interdicting drug traffickers, rather than buying increasingly large frigates which are expensive to buy, maintain and operate.
Update June 2020: the ADF Defence Strategy Update includes items aligned to this approach:
increased investment in capabilities to respond to grey-zone activities, including improved situational awareness, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare and information operations;
measures to enhance ADF support to civil authorities in response to national crises and natural disasters, such as pandemics, bushfires, floods or cyclones.