⚠️ Portfolio Disclosure: This document is an academic assignment completed as part of the Graduate Diploma in Immigration and Citizenship Law (GDipICL), ICL820 — Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Queen's University (Winter 2026). The client names are fictional and were created for academic purposes only. This document does not represent actual legal advice. The student author is not a licensed RCIC and is not authorized to provide immigration advice or represent clients.
Milbonita Altrecha | Student No. 20504227 | Word Count: 649
Assignment 2: Delivering Competent Services
The scope of licence refers to the legal authorization that determines the specific types of advice and services a professional is permitted to provide to the public and is issued by the College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants (CICC). R. held a Class L3-RCIC-IRB Unrestricted Practice Licence, which allowed him to advise and represent clients on all issues under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the Citizenship Act, including appearing before all divisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB).
Scope of practice is determined by knowledge and experience. Although R. was authorized to handle IRPA matters, his three years as an assistant focused on economic-class and temporary-residence applications. Therefore, he limited his practice to these areas.
R.'s scope of practice at the time of opening his practice was more limited and restricted than his licence suggested. His practical experience was confined to temporary residence and economic class applications, gained over several years as an assistant at an immigration firm, as well as knowledge about spousal sponsorships acquired through the GDipICL program and the College's mentorship program. None of his actual work experience, however, involved Family Class applications. Accordingly, Family Class matters were outside his scope of practice because he did not have the requisite knowledge or experience to provide comprehensive advice on the program requirements and policies, or to adequately protect his clients' interests.
R.'s ability to take on F.'s Family Class spousal sponsorship was further affected when his cousin M. convinced him to take the case, saying it was "simple." Although this case was allowed under his licence, it was outside his usual scope of practice. When booking the consultation, R. told M. he had never handled a spousal sponsorship before. Sections 19(1) and 19(2)(a) of the Code of Professional Conduct for College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants Licensees, SOR/2022-128 [the Code] provide that a licensee must not provide services without the right knowledge and experience to do so competently. Because R. lacked the necessary experience in Family Class applications, he was not competent to handle this case safely. He should have declined the initial consultation and referred F. and P. to a consultant with Family Class experience.
Section 1(1)(a) of the Code defines a client as someone who has signed a consultation or service agreement with a licensee. F. and P. became R.'s clients on February 8 when they signed the service agreement, even though their consultation was scheduled for February 10.
M. was not R.'s client. She does not fit under section 1(1)(a), (b), or (c) of the Code. M. referred F. and P., attended the consultation meeting, and agreed to pay the fees for that meeting. However, payment alone does not make someone a client under the Code, and this was also made clear in the initial consultation agreement — even though M. agreed to pay F. and P.'s fees for that meeting. Contacting a professional for advice on behalf of a friend or relative does not make one a client. M. did not sign the consultation or service agreement and did not herself receive immigration services. The duties arising from the Code are owed only to clients, and not to third parties such as M.
R. recognized his lack of experience with spousal sponsorships during his initial call with M. and knew he would need help from a more experienced practitioner. Despite this, he proceeded with the consultation and signed a service agreement. His challenge was not legal authority but insufficient practical experience, which violates section 19(2)(a) of the Code requiring the necessary knowledge and experience for competent service.
This case highlights the critical difference between the scope of a licence and the scope of practice. A broad licence does not guarantee competence in all areas. R.'s experience in economic and temporary residence matters did not equip him for a Family Class case.
R. had two recommended options. First, he could have declined the case when he realized he had no spousal sponsorship experience and referred F. and P. to an experienced Family Class consultant (sections 19(1) and 20(1)(a) of the Code). This would have been the safest choice and would likely have prevented the application from being filed incorrectly. Second, under sections 20(1)(b) and 20(2) of the Code, with full disclosure and written consent, he could have worked with a competent practitioner and handled the case collaboratively. Declining and referring was the better option because R.'s lack of experience was too significant to risk the clients' interests.