| Scenario | T | t | DIVS | Range of s & d |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 136 | 70 | 200 | s(0,100) =>d(66,50) |
| 2 | 50 | 70 | 200 | s(0,100) => d(41,26) |
| 3 | 136 | 70 | 400 | s(0,100) => d(49,32) |
| 4 | 50 | 70 | 400 | s(0,100) => d(26,15) |
| 5 | 136 | 90 | 400 | s(0,100) => d(43,27) |
| 6 | 50 | 90 | 400 | s(0,100) => d(21,12) |
| 7 | 136 | 70 | 600 | s(0,100) => d(39,24) |
| 8 | 136 | 90 | 600 | s(0,100) => d(33,20) |
| 9 | 50 | 70 | 600 | s(0,100) => d(32,19) |
Key Observations & Recommendations:
Feasibility of DIVS at 400 Million (With Withdrawal Cap of 50M)
• If all tokens are acquired from the votable supply (VS), the attacker would require a 26% price loss to be in deficit.
• If all tokens are acquired from the market, a 15% price loss would lead to an attack failure.
• Key Insight: Keeping a withdrawal cap of 50M allows DIVS to be set at 400 million, ensuring economic security while maintaining decentralization.
Feasibility of DIVS at 600 Million (Without Withdrawal Cap)
• If maximum tokens are withdrawn from the treasury, the required price loss for an attack failure ranges from 39% to 24% with a decent voter turnout (t = 70%).
• Acquiring the necessary 213M tokens would take at least 37 days with a 2% price impact, making it highly difficult given current volume and holdings data.
• With a 90% voter turnout, the required price loss drops to 33% to 20%, making an attack nearly impossible.
• Key Insight: At 600M DIVS, an attack attempt is highly unlikely due to the long accumulation period and required price loss conditions.
Impact of Lower DIVS Values
• Lower DIVS values reduce the accumulation period, making it easier to acquire the required tokens with minimal price impact from just a few large holders.
• Even with a withdrawal cap, if DIVS is set at 200M, the required price loss is only 33%, which is unlikely to deter attacks, as tokens could be acquired in less than 20 days.
• Key Insight: A cap on proposal withdrawals is necessary to prevent easy token accumulation and governance manipulation.
TL;DR
If there is no cap on the maximum amount a proposal can ask, DIVS should be 600M. We estimate that the immediate post-attack price depreciation falls within the 24% to 39% range that doesn’t allow a successful attack.
If a withdrawal cap of 50M is enforced, DIVS should be set at 400M, maintaining a strong balance between security and accessibility.
This ensures that governance remains resilient to attacks while keeping proposal funding sustainable.
The assessment is informed by observational data and contextual indicators, and while we believe it to be directionally accurate, we currently lack a formal, objective methodology to substantiate it.