TABLE OF CONTENTS
This case presents the question whether sentencing courts may also consult those additional documents when a defendant was convicted under an “indivisible” statute—i.e., one not containing alternative elements—that criminalizes a broader swath of conduct than the relevant generic offense. That would enable a court to decide, based on information about a case’s underlying facts, that the defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate even though the elements of the crime fail to satisfy our categorical test. Because that result would contravene our prior decisions and the principles underlying them, we hold that sentencing courts may not apply the modified categorical approach when the crime of which the defendant was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements.
In reviewing Silva-Trevino’s case, however, the Attorney General established a new approach that requires immigration judges and the Board to:
(1) look to the statute of conviction under the categorical inquiry and determine whether there is a “realistic probability” that the State or Federal criminal statute pursuant to which the alien was convicted would be applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude; (2) if the categorical inquiry does not resolve the question, engage in a modified categorical inquiry and examine the record of conviction, including documents such as the indictment, the judgment of conviction, jury instructions, a signed guilty plea, and the plea transcript; and (3) if the record of conviction is inconclusive, consider any additional evidence deemed necessary or appropriate to resolve accurately the moral turpitude question. 24 I. & N. Dec. at 704 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has already explained that, where Congress directs courts to determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a certain type of crime, the use of a categorical approach is intended. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). In Taylor, the Court considered whether, when determining if prior offenses constitute previous convictions for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), adjudicators may consider “the particular facts underlying those convictions.” Id. at 600. The Court held that adjudicators may not look beyond the record and associated statutory elements, reasoning that:
[T]he language of 924(e) generally supports the inference that Congress intended the sentencing court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions. Section 924(e)(1) refers to “a person who . . . has three previous convictions” for - not a person who has committed - three previous violent felonies or drug offenses.