Gov 2.0 Kick Off Call.pdf

notes via @zoran. see deck for more

• Diverse group of participants, representing multiple perspectives on DXdao
• How we got here
  • DXdao has governed sustainably for 18 months with holographic consensus
  • REP and DXD launched at different times and never fully reconciled
  • No major conflicts yet, but risks exist now - REP holders could theoretically vote to distribute the treasury to REP holders
• Problems
  • DXD is not sustainably intertwined into DXdao long-term
  • REP holders have no incentive for good governance
• Where DXdao could go:
  • New voting equation (Delphi presented on earlier proposal)
  • Distribution expansion (necDAO lock for REP)
  • DXD staking in holographic consensus
• Next steps:
  • Establish minimum conditions for a resolution. Check out Solution Requirements doc
  • Iterate on functions that fulfill criteria
  • Schedule next call in two weeks on November 17

Questions/comments:

Sasa - Why would you say there is no incentive to good governance?

A: REP holders don’t get paid or have any benchmarks [John]

A: Also why only 40 of 500 REP holders vote [Sky]

Matt P - What are some examples of where REP and DXD have been in conflict?

A: There have not been any strong disagreements, but some of the misalignments have bubbled up in discussions on DXswap launch & bonding curve discussion

Yuri - as a large REP holder, I hold only some DXD, bc there is DXD in the treasury. And I don’t have an incentive to follow the forum and actively vote. I do because it’s interesting, but not incentivized to.

Augusto: REP & DXD holders are both engaged in DXdao, bc there is a significant overlap between DXD and REP holders. The goal here is to encourage engagement even if they are separate individuals

Eylon: Concern that the “REP equation” will include more financial consideration than reputation