| Model | Summary | Infrastructure Features | Link to Sovereignty Objectives |
|---|---|---|---|
| Centralized Identity Management | State or provider controls all identity records directly. | Central database, username/password access, direct government issuance. | Maximum state control, but vulnerability to breaches; weak user autonomy. |
| Federated Identity Management | One or a few providers act as hubs for identity verification across many services. | Identity Providers (IdPs), Single Sign-On (SSO) architectures. | Shared control; reduces duplication, but risks foreign tech dependence. |
| User-Centric Identity | Users control which providers access identity data; providers still involved. | Identity Brokers, Attribute-Based Credentials, Consent Management Platforms. | Strengthens user consent, but still anchored by third-party infrastructure. |
| Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) | Users fully own and manage their identity credentials independently. | Blockchain or Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), Wallets, DIDs, VCs. | Maximizes citizen autonomy and national technological sovereignty; but governance is complex. |
5.2 old introduction for centralised
1. Regulation Alone is Insufficient for Ethical and Effective eID Governance
While digital identity systems rapidly expand, particularly in the Global South, existing legal, regulatory, and administrative processes are inadequate for protecting rights or ensuring responsible governance.
Evidence:
2. Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) Offers Promise—but with Unresolved Practical and Ethical Challenges