0:00 - Christopher Jenkins So there's a mere Dodds note taker and there's Read AI meeting notes We're gonna have more fucking AI joining the meeting than actual fucking people and neither of I didn't pick any of that shit Like what the hell man We're living in an epidemic.

0:28 - Christopher Jenkins Let's see.

0:36 - Christopher Jenkins Mr. CryptoPorn, how are you, sir? Hello, hello.

0:44 - Christopher Jenkins I can't...

0:46 - Alex Devoto First time seeing some new faces here.

0:50 - Alex Devoto Yeah, Mike is in there.

0:52 - Christopher Jenkins Where is my god damn?

1:00 - Christopher Jenkins There it is.

1:15 - merdad mms I've lost it.

1:27 - Christopher Jenkins I want to use the document that merdad created as a sort All right, so it looks like everybody is primarily here and Tracie of a pseudo agenda.

1:47 - Christopher Jenkins So if we start with this, I think that'll give us a foundation of what we want to accomplish and then There are some things about the desired outcome that are outlined in here that I think essentially take your doc, Alex, and we can go through some of the outline structure and see if we can work out what makes sense here. We have all of the integrations and the tooling for that.

2:31 - Christopher Jenkins But the North Stars here are the ones that I outlined And to give a quick rundown of that, proposals are created on chain. They are enshrined within a governance transaction. The Cosmos voting system also integrates into Cosmos Hub, which becomes the forum for discussion and debate and all the rest of that. There is a forum and a stake and quorum requirement in putting up proposals. I think 10 Atom or whatever is like the current default stake requirement for that. And then if the proposal passes, it is immediately entered into the validation cycle to be performed by the validators as a governance transaction or upgrade as the case may be.

3:28 - Christopher Jenkins We want to avoid needing to build custom tooling. We have neither the budget nor the team to do a bunch of ad hoc development shit. And honestly, there's enough tooling out there. We don't need it. The DAO has wasted extraordinary amounts of money on that in the past. And it's just not necessary. And simple. We want to go with as minimal moving components as possible. One of the reasons that DNA failed was it was this big, complicated fucking thing that no one even understood. And I think more people voted against it. It simply because they couldn't figure out what the fuck it meant. And so they weren't going to adopt it as a governance track system. There are some core themes identified in our previous work. That is builder representation, balance of power, eliminating a pure pay-to-play system, captureless and secure. I don't know that we've ever really hit the mark on that. And dynamic. And we can kind of talk about what dynamic means as part of this discussion. There are a couple of things that I want to outline as some initial criticisms that I have of our previous system after a lot of my own research and thought on the topic. One of which is we know for a fact it wasn't captureless at all. Pocket Fund when they entered the ecosystem almost got themselves like million pocket to build a wallet that to date hasn't been delivered, an actual mobile wallet app. They did end up with a second proposal that they got through and they were paid by the DAO for that, but they never actually delivered on it at all.

5:15 - Christopher Jenkins And they were able to almost pass that first one, which was an insane ask for a product that never got delivered or even one that did. It was just an outsized request by a lot because they were able to add five new in our much vaunted builder system in the course of 30 days by sharing infrastructure and meeting all the requirement needs. Technologists and people who have technology companies have a significant advantage over any other actor in the current system, period, because they can easily game the node requirements around becoming a builder. And so one of the things that I want to sort of level set set about is that our anti-plutocratic system was never effectively anti-plutocratic at all. Instead of having the money to buy a yacht, it said, well, you've got a yacht. You're good. And that's effectively how it worked. People with more resources were capable of generating voters quickly, and they came to dominate the Dow for the most part. That was represented in Thunderhead. That was represented in Pocket Fund. That was represented in the SendWallet slash NoteWallet crews. Began to build up political factions within the DAO and all of them came about because they had a ton of resources that they could throw at this and shared infrastructure that allowed them to duplicate efforts across multiple voting actors. So the system was just flat-out broken. It didn't do any of the things that it claimed to do. What it did do was made it really fucking hard for regular-ass people to get a Dow vote. And we saw that sputter out very, very quickly. We tried to set up the shepherd path, which was the only effective way for a non-technical holder to get a vote in the Dow, but half of them had no following on Twitter and were just not social media people. They were just investors and holders and active community members. But there was no path to representation for them at all. Any effective way. We had a DAO that was made up of warring political factions, mostly focused on how much they could extract themselves from the DAO budget and screaming loudly at the persecution anytime one of their attempts to extract value was shot down by the DAO. So that's where I sit. In much previous history analysis and lots of opinions about the whole thing, I fundamentally stand on the side of our principles and values were good, our execution was incredibly broken.

8:04 - Christopher Jenkins And I'll open up the floor there.

8:08 - Alex Devoto I guess I'll jump in first here. I mean, I pushed back slightly on that, right? In The Shepherd's Path, it was relatively easy for people with an inclination to get a vote. So the pocket pool team, a bunch of us. I think we were the second biggest single block of voting after Pocket Fund. I think we all got our votes from the Shepard's Path. It was laborious enough that we only did it because if it wasn't part of our job, it was certainly very helpful to us to try and get money in other ways. So I agree about extracting money from the Dow. And it was probably too hard for the average voter to bother to spend a month trying to get their vote.

8:48 - Alex Devoto But yeah, I think that was the only thing I'd push back slightly, although I agree with 95% of what you said there.

8:56 - Alex Devoto And the second thing I'll put in here anyway is the thought I've been thinking over, which I think should kind of add to how we're going to build this, is one of the biggest problems we have with DNA and trying to build the old DAO was thinking we're going to have tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people voting. And trying to build a system which could work for that and sort of be anti-sybil and sort of not be captured. I think it would be much cleverer, quicker, cheaper, and just more intelligent to look at how do we build a system for hundreds of people. I think that's really important. So if we spend too much time trying to defend against something which is not going to happen, well that's the very end of the long term. What's going to happen because we have a million people and something happens. So I think in reality, you know, it's just not that interesting and not that many people spend that much time voting. So I think, you know, building a system which is resistant against, which works with several hundred people in resistance against smaller teams like that is probably what we should aim for. You know, so the perfect is the devil of the good. So that's going to be my other sort of my other point there. I'll leave it at that.

10:08 - merdad mms Yeah, I completely agree with you that I don't think like in the near future we're going to have like a million people voting and the system should work for 100 people. I wasn't, to be honest with you, I don't think I was part of the shepherd path and like things that before happened before the new governance structure that was coming to play. I was actually the main person that was building this system alongside Jack and the previous team. So I have like in-depth knowledge about what happened and like a lot of issues that like I saw as someone that was like building it. I wasn't part of the design of it. I was just building the system out and I could constantly see issues that pop up. And for example, like it was very confusing. It was very hard. The solutions that we have on the civil resistance side, they are not good enough at the moment without doxing a person, like if you can dox someone, verify them, do some level of KYC, yes, it's very much so resistant, but if you do not do that and you want the anonymity, it's not that possible. I'm also like, I have been talking to Gitcoin, I've been talking to a lot of people on the Ethereum side of things, and even Gitcoin is moving away from Gitcoin Passport, that at that time we were trying to use Gitcoin Passport. So it hasn't been effective for them and those are the people that build it and they are using it for like last couple of rounds of gg20 one two three four and like the other ones and apart from that the system was the reduction function that we put in that to like prevent people to pay to play uh that's I tried multiple times I built many models in Excel to try to show to people that it is completely captureless, but it wasn't. I knew that it wasn't, and I did my best to show that we have covered all of the bases. But when you put in a variable like that in a governance model, you cannot control it. You either have to have a service that completely eliminates civil and civil attacks. But if you can't do that, then you're opening your system to capture. And that is why, like, I don't know personally any other governance model out there that has a reduction function in their voting. Something that was proposed multiple times in, like, previous iterations of governance that we're trying to build in order to eliminate the problem of pay to play and put that for SQL.

13:02 - Christopher Jenkins Are you talking about like quadratic voting or immediate voting? Yeah, no, no.