eval injection on -clip_values / -input_shape in ART Kubeflow evaluation scriptMITRE service request: 1988584
Status: RESERVED (pending a qualifying public reference per CNA Rules §5.3).
The Adversarial Robustness Toolbox (ART) thru 1.20.1 contains a command-line argument injection vulnerability in its Kubeflow component (robustness_evaluation_fgsm_pytorch.py). The script uses the unsafe eval() function to parse string values provided via the –clip_values and –input_shape command-line arguments. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary Python code into these arguments, which will be executed when eval() is called. The vulnerability can be exploited remotely if an attacker can control these arguments (e.g., through pipeline configuration or automated scripts), leading to arbitrary code execution on the system running the ART evaluation.
argparse stores user strings for --clip_values / --input_shape, later passed to eval() verbatim. Attackers who can alter pipeline specs or CI parameters can slip lambda-based payloads that execute side effects while still returning tuples that satisfy downstream shape logic.
clip_values = eval(args.clip_values) (and analogous input_shape).High for automated pipelines without parameter review.
eval with ast.literal_eval or strict parsers.