This paper will argue for the idea that 'value-free science' is an impossibility, but that this doesn't put in question neither scientific realism nor the explanatory success of science, but requires a modulation of the concept of objectivity.

Wilfrid Sellars states on 'philosophy and the scientific image of man' that science is “the measure of all things" but as radical normativist, he articulates in “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” that “in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description but placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says”. Through this we can question the possibility of value free objectivity, since while science provides the best world-describing framework, the formalization of these descriptions cannot but rely on faulty concepts established via inferential practices of human communities.

Following Daston and Gallison work on objectivity (2007), the paper argues for a reframing of objectivity as a kind of intersubjectivity that maintains science explanatory primacy while establishing a non-reductive framework to evaluate the use of value laden vocabulary such as thick concepts, a perspective indebted to Dennet's work on 'Real patterns' (1991) and its further application to philosophy of science by Ladyman and Ross (2004).