<aside> 💡 In this article, I develop a formal model of free will for complex systems based on emergent properties and adaptive selection. The model is based on a process ontology in which a free choice is a singular process that takes a system from one macrostate to another. I quantify the model by introducing a formal measure of the ‘freedom’ of a singular choice. The ‘free will’ of a system, then, is emergent from the aggregate freedom of the choice processes carried out by the system. The focus in this model is on the actual choices themselves viewed in the context of processes. That is, the nature of the system making the choices is not considered. Nevertheless, my model does not necessarily conflict with models that are based on internal properties of the system. Rather it takes a behavioral approach by focusing on the externalities of the choice process.
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What is it that we mean when we ask if a system possesses free will? In most discussions of free will, the nature of what freedom entails is often taken for granted; if we ask if a given choice is free, we are assuming that it is a well-formed question to begin with. Rather than asking if a given choice is free, we might instead ask what, in general, a free choice is. In other words, a more formal and rigorous definition of freedom of choice ought to be a prerequisite to any deeper understanding of free will.
This is not merely academic. In EPR tests in quantum mechanics, it is often assumed that the experimenters have free will (see [1] for an overview). On the other hand, as Bell suggested, one could replace the experimenters with a pair of machines capable of making suitably random measurements [2]. The variables measured by the machine are the same as the variables measured by the experimenters, but do machines carrying out pre-programmed algorithms to produce random measurements count as having free will? While they might produce measurements that are provably more randomly chosen than those chosen by experimenters, it is hard to say if a presumably non-conscious entity can possess free will. Therein lies the problem. Does it even make sense to refer to the machine’s actions, which are guided by a pre-programmed algorithm, as making a choice? As Nozick has rightly pointed out, “[a]n action’s being non-determined is not sufficient for it to be free–it might just be a random act” [3]. A random act is no more free than a fully determined one.
Thus, it is that freedom of choice has a bearing on the nature of consciousness. Does our conception of consciousness drive our definition of free will or is it the other way around? Explicating the relationship between consciousness and volition has moved well beyond the theoretical. Famously, the Libet experiments suggest to some that volition can be an unconscious act [4]. Additional experiments have built on Libet’s work [5,6]. On the other hand, our judgment of what this means appears to be driven by the outcomes. Specifically, experimental work by Shepherd suggests that the conscious causation of behavior tends to be judged as being free even when the causation is explicitly deterministic [7].
The question of whether free will is compatible or incompatible with (causal) determinism has long been central to the nature of free will, at least in the Western perspective [8]. However, the indeterminacy of quantum systems raises similar issues for seemingly opposite reasons [9,10]. In other words, one could argue that both causal determinism as well as quantum indeterminacy are incompatible with free will. On the one hand, one can deny the existence of free will on the grounds that all choices are pre-determined in some way. On the other hand, one can deny the existence of free will on the grounds that all choices are simply macro-manifestations of random quantum processes, i.e., the universe is nothing but a collection of randomly fluctuating quantum fields. However, this misses a deeper point captured succinctly by O’Connor when he notes that “though freedom of will requires a baseline capacity of choice …the freedom this capacity makes possible is, nevertheless, a property that comes in degrees and can vary over time within an individual” [11] p. 183 (original emphasis). The usual debate over the existence of free will is thus really a debate over the capacity of choice. Less attention is paid to the nature of the freedom that this capacity makes possible. It is this freedom that is the motivation for the model described in this article.
In order to build a model of the freedom engendered by the existence of a capacity of choice, it is necessary to assume that such a capacity exists. As such, the model that follows sidesteps the question of whether or not free will actually exists. Rather, it proceeds from the assumption that capacity of choice exists for some systems and develops a measure for the freedom that follows from this assumption. The model is based on a process ontology in which a free choice is a process that takes a system from one macrostate to another. I lay the groundwork for this by first describing the self-evident characteristics of what I will call adaptive free choices. This very roughly corresponds to what O’Connor calls “willing” or the “conscious forming of an intention to act” (see [11], p. 178) though it does not explicitly presume an agent or system is conscious. I then develop the process ontology on which the formal model is constructed where I show that both determinism and indeterminism have a role to play in the nature of free choices. The formal model is then quantified by the 𝜁�-function as a measure of free choice and the Z-function as a corresponding measure of free will which is taken to be an aggregation of free choices. Free will in this model, then, is not taken to be the capacity of choice, but rather is viewed as an aggregation of the freedoms that a capacity of choice, if it exists, would make possible. Finally, I discuss methods for assessing certain aspects of the model and for assigning values to certain variables within the model.
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SUMMARY:
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